Mercer Law Review
Volume 69
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 17

12-2017

Torts
Christopher R. Breault
Christopher B. Newbern
Brian C. Mickelsen

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Breault, Christopher R.; Newbern, Christopher B.; and Mickelsen, Brian C. (2017) "Torts," Mercer Law
Review: Vol. 69 : No. 1 , Article 17.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol69/iss1/17

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Torts
by Christopher R. Breault*
Christopher B. Newbern"
and Brian C. Mickelsen'
This Article surveys recent developments in Georgia tort law between
June 1, 2016 and May 31, 2017.1
I. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

In Thomas v. Tenet Healthsystem GB, Inc. ,2 the Georgia Court of
Appeals addressed whether physicians accused of malpractice were
independent contractors of a defendant hospital. 3 The plaintiff was
involved in an automobile collision and arrived at Atlanta Medical
Center's (AMC) emergency room on a backboard and with a cervical spine
collar. A radiologist performed and read a CT scan, found no fractures,
and communicated this to a physician working in AMC's emergency
room. The emergency room physician instructed an AMC nurse to remove
the cervical spine collar and discharge the plaintiff from the hospital. The
plaintiff was then placed in a wheelchair and taken to the curb to await
her ride home. The plaintiffs brother arrived to pick her up and found
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1. For an analysis of tort law during the prior survey period, see Phillip Comer
Griffeth, Christopher R. Breault & Christopher Barwick Newbern, Torts, Annual Survey of
Georgia Law, 68 MERCER L. REV. 279 (2016).
2. 340 Ga. App. 78, 796 S.E.2d 307 (2017).
3. Id. at 78, 796 S.E.2d at 308.
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her unresponsive and slumped over in the wheelchair. She was
readmitted to AMC and found to have a cervical fracture. When the
cervical collar was removed, the fracture was displaced, causing spinal
and neurological damage. 4
The plaintiff sued AMC for imputed liability based on the actions of
the radiologist and emergency room physician. AMC filed a motion for
summary judgment pursuant to Section 51-2-5.1(f) 5 of the Official Code
of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), which states:
Whether a health care professional is an actual agent, an employee, or
an independent contractor shall be determined by the language of the
contract between the health care professional and the hospital. In the
absence of such a contract, or if the contract is unclear or ambiguous,
a health care professional shall only be considered the hospital's
employee or actual agent if it can be shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that the hospital reserves the right to control the time,
manner, or method in which the health care professional performs the
services for which licensed, as distinguished from the right to merely
require certain definite results.6
The radiologist and physician involved were each part of a separate
physician group, and each of those groups had a contract for services with
AMC. The contract for services described the physicians as independent
contractors. It was on this basis that the trial court found summary
judgment was proper, and AMC was not liable for the actions of the
radiologist and physician.7
The court of appeals disagreed and reversed because O.C.G.A.
§ 51-2-5.1(f) makes no mention of physician groups or contracts that exist
between physician groups and hospitals, but only mentions health care
professionals and hospitals.8 The court noted that, although AMC is not
entitled to summary judgment under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5.1(f), it may be
entitled to summary judgment under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5.1(g) 9 which states
that "[i]f the court finds that there is no contract or that the contract is
unclear or ambiguous as to the relationship between the hospital and

4.
5.
6.
5.1(f)).
7.
8.
9.

Id.
O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5.1(f) (2017).
Thomas, 340 Ga. App. at 78-79, 796 S.E.2d at 308-09 (quoting O.C.G.A.
Id. at 80, 796 S.E.2d at 309.
Id. at 80-81, 796 S.E.2d at 309.
O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5.1(g) (2017).
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health care professional," a court may consider a variety of factors to
determine whether an agency relationship exists.' 0
In a separate appeal," the court of appeals took up an additional issue
concerning the "relation back" of claims added after the expiration of the
original statute of limitations. The original complaint was filed against
the radiologist, physician, and AMC. After learning during discovery that
AMC's policy prohibited nurses from removing a cervical collar-as
happened here-the plaintiff amended the complaint after the expiry of
the statute of limitations, adding allegations of simple negligence against
AMC for its nurse's conduct.12
AMC filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations
had passed and the new claims, as put forth in the amended complaint,
did not relate back to the original complaint.1 3 The court of appeals
disagreed, stating that the relation back provision of the Georgia Civil
Practice Act14 should be construed liberally and states, "Whenever the
claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arises out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth
in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the
original pleading." 15 The court stated, "The question of relation back of
the amendment turns on fair notice of the same general fact situation
from which the claims arises."1 6 The court held that because the original
complaint alleged that "the C-collar was removed by Defendant Atlanta
Medical personnel"1 7 and AMC had fair notice of the same general fact
situation from which the simple negligence claim arose, the trial court
erred and AMC's motion to dismiss should have been denied.18
In Doctors Hospital of Augusta, LLC v. Alicea,19 the Georgia Supreme
Court held that to qualify for immunity from civil liability for
noncompliance with a health care agent's directions, a surgeon and
medical staff must act in good faith reliance on the agent's instructions

10.

Thomas, 340 Ga. App. at 81, 796 S.E.2d at 309-10 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5.1

(g)(1)(2)).

11. Thomas v. Tenet Healthsystem GB, Inc., 340 Ga. App. 70, 796 S.E.2d 301 (2017),
cert. granted, No. 517C1021, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 715 (Aug. 28, 2017).
12. Id. at 70-72, 796 S.E.2d at 302-03.
13. Id. at 71, 796 S.E.2d at 302.
14. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c) (2017).
15. Thomas, 340 Ga. App. at 72, 796 S.E.2d at 303 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c)).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 73, 796 S.E.2d at 303.
18. Id. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari on this issue. Tenet
Healthsystem GB, Inc., 2017 Ga. LEXIS 715, at *1.
19. 299 Ga. 315, 788 S.E.2d 392 (2016).
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not to provide life-saving treatment to the patient in question. 20 In this
case, the patient had executed an "advanced directive" which designated
her granddaughter as her healthcare agent. The patient told her
granddaughter directly and stated in the advanced directive she did not
want action taken to prolong her life if she had an incurable and
irreversible condition that would result in her death in a relatively short
period of time. 21
At age ninety-one, the patient was admitted to the hospital where
blood tests and a chest x-ray showed that she was suffering from
pneumonia, sepsis, and acute renal failure. Her granddaughter
accompanied her to the hospital and gave the hospital the advance
directive. 22 The granddaughter spoke to the surgeon treating her
grandmother and told him about the advance directive and that "by no
means was CPR [cardio-pulmonary resuscitation] to ever be
administered," and "no heroic measures were to be used" to prolong the
patient's life. 23 During her care at the hospital, the patient was
intubated, had most of her right lung removed, and was put on a
ventilator-all in contradiction to what the advanced directive dictated
and the explicit directions of the patient's health care agent, her
granddaughter. After multiple other procedures and surgeries to extend
the patient's life, she finally died ten days after she was admitted to the
hospital. 24
The plaintiff sued the hospital and surgeon alleging breach of contract,
professional and ordinary negligence, medical battery, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty. 25 Following
discovery, and pursuant to the Advance Directive Act, 26 the defendants
filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied, on the basis
that they were immune from liability. After taking up the issue on
interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals also denied the motion, holding
that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment because there
was a genuine issue of material fact whether a good faith effort was made
to rely on the advanced directive and the directions of the granddaughter,
the health care agent. 27

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 329, 788 S.E.2d at 403-04.
Id. at 316, 788 S.E.2d at 395.
Id. at 317, 788 S.E.2d at 395.
Id. at 317, 788 S.E.2d at 396 (alteration in original).
Id. at 318-20, 788 S.E.2d at 396-97.
Id. at 320, 788 S.E.2d at 397.
O.C.G.A. § 31-32-10(a)(2)-(3) (2017).
Doctors Hosp., 299 Ga. at 321, 788 S.E.2d at 398.
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The Georgia Supreme Court held that "the Advance Directive Act is
all about letting patients and their health care agents, rather than the
health care provider, control such decisions," such as those pertaining to
invasive "life-sustaining" procedures. 28 The supreme court affirmed the
ruling of the court of appeals and trial court, stating that the surgeon
(and hospital) is not entitled to immunity because he did not act "in good
faith reliance-in honest dependence" on any decision made by the
patient's health care agent-he did not make any decision whatsoever
based on the advanced directive. 29
II. PREMISES LIABILITY
The opinion in George v. Hercules Real Estate Services, Inc.30 concerns
a resident at an apartment complex who was shot and severely injured
during an attempted home invasion. The resident's apartment unit had
been burglarized approximately one month before the subject incident.
Sometime thereafter, the management company overseeing the
apartment complex repaired the resident's front door and installed a
metal burglar guard. In addition, all units in the complex, including the
resident's, had alarm systems, which included a twenty-four-hour panic
button. According to the resident, he obtained a shotgun following the
burglary because he believed the complex was unsafe. 31
In the early morning hours, the resident heard a knock at his door. He
turned the porch light on and looked through the peephole. He saw the
silhouette of an individual but did not hear anything from the person on
the other side of the door. Although he was not expecting additional
guests, he opened the door a bit and propped his foot against it. Once he
opened the door, a second individual appeared, and the two individuals
then attempted to push the door open. The resident tried but failed to
push the door closed, and he then retrieved his shotgun. He shot at the
intruders, who in return shot the resident four times. The intruders fled
and were never apprehended. Although the management company had
on-site security at various times, requests for increased security had been
made before the attempted home invasion. The resident sued the
management company alleging negligent security. The management
company later moved for summary judgment, which the trial court
granted. 32

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 330, 788 S.E.2d at 404.
Id.
339 Ga. App. 843, 795 S.E.2d 81 (2016).
Id. at 843-44, 795 S.E.2d at 84.
Id. at 844, 795 S.E.2d at 84.
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In a divided opinion, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment. 33 The majority opinion held that
summary judgment was proper because the resident failed to provide
evidence sufficient to establish causation. 34 Specifically, the majority
noted several security measures that had been instituted at the
apartment complex as part of a $7 million renovation. These measures
included security alarms in each unit, exterior security cameras, security
guards who worked at varying hours of the day, a twenty-four-hour
number for maintenance and security issues, the installation of an entry
gate, and additional measures involving residents and local law
enforcement. In addition, the management company noted the resident
had not submitted any expert evidence or other testimony in the record
that would demonstrate that any additional security measures would
have prevented the shooting that occurred when the resident voluntarily
opened his door to a stranger past midnight. 35
In Martin v. Six Flags Over Georgia II, L.P., 36 the Georgia Supreme
Court reinstated a $35 million jury award given to a young man left
permanently brain damaged from a beating he received while waiting for
a bus after visiting Six Flags Over Georgia.37 Earlier that day, a group of
men alleged to have been gang members, some of whom were off-duty Six
Flags employees, threatened two families. The families alerted Six Flags
security officers, who then confronted the men and reprimanded them
but then released them back into the park. Shortly before the amusement
park closed, Plaintiff Joshua Martin, his brother, and his friend left to
use the restroom at a nearby hotel before returning to the front entrance
of the park where they waited for the next bus. This same group of young
men surrounded Martin and, without provocation, proceeded to beat him
with brass knuckles. The attack left Martin in a coma for seven days with
severe, permanent brain damage. 38
Martin filed a lawsuit alleging that Six Flags failed to exercise
ordinary care to keep the park premises and approaches safe for him as
its "invitee." Martin's attorneys argued that Six Flags was aware its park
was located in a high-crime area and there had been gang activity in the
past in the park itself, including the involvement of some of its
employees. Prior to the attack, gang-related criminal activity inside the
park had occasionally spilled over to areas outside the park, and

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 852, 795 S.E.2d at 90.
Id. at 848, 795 S.E.2d at 87.
Id. at 845-46, 795 S.E.2d at 85.
301 Ga. 323, 324, 801 S.E.2d 24 (2017).
Id. at 324, 801 S.E.2d at 27.
Id. at 324-26, 801 S.E.2d at 28-29.
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incidents were of particular concern at the park's closing time when
attendees were funneled into parking lots and nearby bus stops. 39
A jury awarded Martin $35 million, apportioning 8% of fault to the
criminal assailants and the remaining 92% of the fault to Six Flags. The
Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment but ordered a new trial
because the verdict form failed to list two additional individuals Six Flags
claimed were involved in the attack and, thus, should have shared in the
apportionment of damages. Both Six Flags and Martin appealed to the
Georgia Supreme Court. 40 The supreme court agreed to consider whether
the court of appeals erred in determining that Six Flags could be held
liable for Martin's injuries, and assuming liability was proper, whether
an error in the apportionment of damages required a full retrial.4 1
The court held that Six Flags could not escape liability simply because
an attack that originated on Six Flags property was completed off the
property. 42 The evidence established that Martin's injuries:
[WV]ere the culmination of a continuous string of events that were
planned on Six Flags property, were executed at least in part on Six
Flags property, and were the result of a failure by Six Flags to 'exercise
ordinary care to protect [its] invitee from unreasonable risks' that Six
Flags understood, and even tried to obscure from its patrons. 4 3
As to the issue of apportionment, the court explained that Georgia's
apportionment statute states that "once liability has been established
and the damages sustained by the plaintiff have been calculated, the trier
of fact must then assess the relative fault of all those who contributed to
the plaintiffs injury-including the plaintiff himself-and apportion the
damages based on this assessment of relative fault." 4 4 Therefore, once
liability has been established, there is a two-step process. The first step
is the calculation of the total damages, and the second step is to allocate
fault. 45 Since these are two distinct steps, the court found no reason why
the two steps could not be segregated for purposes of retrial.46
Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and reversed the court of

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 327-29, 801 S.E.2d at 30.
at
at
at
at
at
at

336-37, 801 S.E.2d at 35.
329, 801 S.E.2d at 30.
328-29, 801 S.E.2d at 30.
338, 801 S.E.2d at 36-37.
338, 801 S.E.2d at 37.
339, 801 S.E.2d at 37.
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appeals' holding that a full retrial was required.4 7 Instead, the court
limited a retrial to the apportionment of damages."4
In Harrisonv. McAfee, 49 the issue before the Georgia Court of Appeals
was whether O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99,50 which tolls the statute of limitations
period for tort claims filed by crime victims until the prosecution of such
crime has become final or otherwise terminated, applied regardless of
whether the defendant has been accused of committing the crime from
which the cause of action arose. 5 1 The court answered affirmatively,
reversing the lower court and overruling its prior decisions. 52
A masked man burst into a bar, shot, and severely injured an innocent
patron. More than two years after the incident, the patron brought a
premises liability action against the owners of the bar for their failure to
maintain safe premises. Typically, there is a two-year statute of
limitations for personal injury claims. 53 The plain language of O.C.G.A.
§ 9-3-99, however, states that the period of limitations is tolled until the
criminal prosecution is final, is otherwise terminated, or for up to six
years, whichever comes first, for any cause of action in tort that may be
brought by a crime victim and which arises out of the facts and
circumstances relating to the commission of such alleged crime. 54 The
court held that the statute applies regardless of whether the defendant
in the case has been accused of committing the crime from which the
cause of action arises.55
III. APPORTIONMENT
In Camelot Club Condominium Ass'n v. Afari-Opoku,5 6 the decedent
was shot and killed at an apartment complex. The decedent's spouse
brought a wrongful death action against the apartment complex and
security company for their failure to keep the premises safe. At trial, the
jury awarded the spouse $3.25 million in damages, apportioning 25% of
fault for the decedent's death against the apartment complex, 25%
against the security company, and the remaining 50% against the
criminal assailants. The trial court issued judgment in the amount of

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 341, 801 S.E.2d at 38.
Id.
338 Ga. App. 393, 788 S.E.2d 872 (2016).
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99 (2017).
Harrison,338 Ga. App. at 394, 788 S.E.2d at 873.
Id.
Id. at 394, 788 S.E.2d at 873-74.
Id. at 395, 788 S.E.2d at 874.
Id. at 402, 788 S.E.2d at 879.
340 Ga. App. 618, 798 S.E.2d 241 (2017).
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$1.625 million, which accounted for the 25% fault assigned to the
apartment complex plus the 25% fault assigned to the security company.
The apartment complex appealed, arguing (1) the trial court should have
granted the complex's motion for a directed verdict and (2) the complex
should not be liable for the security company's percentage of fault. 7
On the motion for the directed verdict, the court determined that
multiple prior crimes on and around the apartment complex, along with
testimony from the apartment complex's CEO that he was personally
aware of crimes taking place on the property, was enough to establish
that the shooting was reasonably foreseeable.5 8 Further, the court held
that a crime does not have to originate on the landowner's property to
make the landowner liable.5 9
On the apportionment issue, the court cited PN Express, Inc. v. Zegele0
which states that the apportionment statute does not apply to claims of
vicarious liability. 61 According to the court, "[W]here a party's liability is
solely vicarious, that party and the actively-negligent tortfeasor are
regarded as a single tortfeasor." 62 The issue before the court of appeals
was whether the claims against the apartment complex and security
company were solely vicarious or whether there were additional and
independent acts of negligence alleged against the security company. 63
Because a landowner's duty to maintain a safe premises pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 51-3-164 is nondelegable, the landowner is liable for any
wrongful act in violation of the statute by an independent contractor such
as a security company.6 5
However, in Camelot, in addition to a negligence per se claim, the
spouse brought general negligence and public nuisance claims.
Therefore, the jury could have found the security company to be
independently liable under a general negligence theory.6 6 Since there was
no way for the court to determine under which theory the jury
apportioned fault to the two parties, the court held that the trial court

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
at 680,
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 618, 798 S.E.2d at 243-44.
Id. at 621-22, 798 S.E.2d at 246.
Id. at 623, 798 S.E.2d at 246-47.
304 Ga. App. 672, 697 S.E.2d 226 (2010).
Camelot, 340 Ga. App. at 626, 798 S.E.2d at 249.
Id. at 627, 798 S.E.2d at 249 (emphasis omitted) (quoting PNExpress, 304 Ga. App.
697 S.E.2d at 233).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 (2017).
Camelot, 340 Ga. App. at 627, 798 S.E.2d at 249.
Id. at 628, 798 S.E.2d at 250.
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erred in imposing liability on the apartment complex for the security
company's share of fault.67
IV. SUICIDE LIABILITY
In City of Richmond Hill v. Maja, 68 the plaintiffs brought a wrongful
death suit against the mayor, city council of the City of Richmond Hill,
and an individual police officer of the Richmond Hill Police Department
regarding the suicide of their fourteen-year-old daughter. Two months
before the suicide, the plaintiffs' daughter had attempted a previous
suicide by cutting herself. Officers of the Richmond Hill Police
Department responded to the hospital to investigate and photographed
the girl's injuries. Later that month, the defendant officer accessed the
photographs on his work computer and showed them to his own
daughter, a classmate of the plaintiffs' daughter. The defendant officer's
daughter thereafter showed the photographs to other classmates. After
learning about the disclosure of the photographs, the plaintiffs' daughter
vented to a school official about her frustration that the photographs
were revealed, about school gossip, and about disappointing her mother;
she committed suicide that evening.6 9
In their complaint against the City of Richmond Hill and the police
officer, the plaintiffs alleged the officer had a duty to keep the injury
photographs confidential, that he breached that duty, that he should
have known the publication of the photographs created a reasonable
apprehension that the decedent would further harm herself, and that the
decedent's suicide was caused by the officer's negligent conduct. The
defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that no proximate
cause could be shown because the decedent's suicide was an independent
act breaking the chain of causation from any events preceding the death.
The defendants further asserted that none of the exceptions to the
general rule regarding suicide applied. The trial court denied the
defendants' motion, and the denial was affirmed by the Georgia Court of
Appeals. 70
The Georgia Supreme Court ultimately reversed in favor of the
defendants.7 1 The court agreed that suicide, as a general rule, is "an
unforeseeable intervening cause that breaks any causal connection
between alleged negligent conduct and the resulting death." 72 The court
67. Id.
68. 301 Ga. 257, 800 S.E.2d 573 (2017).
69. Id. at 257-58, 800 S.E.2d at 576.
70. Id. at 258, 800 S.E.2d at 576.
71. Id. at 257, 800 S.E.2d at 575.
72. Id. at 258, 800 S.E.2d at 576.
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noted that only two exceptions are recognized in Georgia law to this
general rule: (1) "the so called rage-or-frenzy exception" and (2) "the
special-relationship exception." 73
As to the rage-or-frenzy exception, the court explained that "[w]here
the tortfeasor's wrongful act causes the injured party to kill himself
during a rage or frenzy, or in response to an uncontrollable impulse, the
wrongful act is considered to be the proximate cause of the suicide." 74 n
such circumstances, the resulting act of suicide "is not a voluntary one,
but is involuntary, and is not an act which breaks the causal connection
between the homicide and the act which caused the injury." 75 However,
the rage-or-frenzy exception "is not met simply by evidence of depression
or anger," and instead "requires a showing that the suicide was a product
of insanity, delirium, an uncontrollable impulse, or was accomplished
without conscious volition to produce death."7 6
As to the special-relationship exception, the court explained that
suicide may not absolve an alleged tortfeasor of liability when there is "a
special relationship between the tortfeasor and decedent, such as where
a tortfeasor owes the unusual duty to prevent the decedent from harm."7 7
The court gave examples of such relationships, including "doctorpatient," "hospital-patient," "police officer-detainee," and "jailerprisoner," noting that "a duty to protect arises under such
circumstances."7 8 However, the court clarified "the duty is not owed to
the public at large, but, instead, the duty is owed specifically to prisoners
or detainees."79
The court concluded that the plaintiffs could not prove proximate
causation as a matter of law because neither of these exceptions applied
to the circumstances of the plaintiffs' daughter's death.80 The court found
no evidence of "rage-or-frenzy" in the decedent's death:
[N]either [the daughter's] continued distress regarding the disclosure
of the photos nor her subsequent "rampage" wherein she ranted to her
softball coach about the various stressors in her life, is sufficient to
evidence that [she] killed herself during a rage or frenzy, or in response

73. Id. at 259-60, 800 S.E.2d at 577.
74. Id. at 260, 800 S.E.2d at 577 (quoting Dry Storage Corp. v. Piscopo, 249 Ga. App.
898, 900, 550 S.E.2d 419, 420 (2001)).
75. Id. (quoting Elliott v. Stone Baking Co., 49 Ga. App. 515, 515, 176 S.E. 112, 112
(1934)).
76. Id. at 260, 800 S.E.2d at 577-78.
77. Id. at 260, 800 S.E.2d at 578.
78. Id. at 260-61, 800 S.E.2d at 578.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 262, 800 S.E.2d at 578-79.
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to an uncontrollable impulse. In fact, the record indicates that [her]
final conversation with her mother was calm and rational.8 1
The court also determined there was no evidence of a special
relationship between the plaintiffs' daughter and the defendant police
officer:
[Although the officer] owed a general duty to protect both the general
public and [the decedent], there is no evidence that [the officer] owed
a specific duty to [the decedent] to protect her from harm; in fact, the
only allegation is that [the officer] was negligent in his treatment of
the injury photos, not that [the officer] owed or violated some duty to
protect [the decedent]. At the time of the alleged negligent conduct and
at the time of the subsequent suicide, [the officer] had no ability to
supervise [the decedent], to make decisions about her healthcare, or to
exercise custody or control over her. 82
V. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
The Georgia Supreme Court overruled the court of appeals in a case
involving a patient who was sexually assaulted by a nurse anesthetist
while under anesthesia at a dental office.83 The male nurse anesthetist
made three video recordings with his cell phone showing him sexually
molesting the patient. These videos were later discovered when the cell
phone was found hidden under a bathroom sink, where it had been
recording employees using the restroom. Examination of the phone also
revealed videotapes of this same nurse sexually molesting other
anesthetized female patients.8 4
The patient sued the dental clinic and the case proceeded to trial.
During trial, expert witnesses opined that the dental practice had
violated statutory requirements for dentists supervising anesthetists and
had violated standards of care for monitoring patients under anesthesia.
The jury awarded $3.7 million and apportioned 100% of the liability to
85
the dental clinic.
On appeal, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals on two
issues.88 First, the court of appeals determined there was evidence that
the dental clinic breached its duties to follow professional standards
regarding the extent to which the patient was anesthetized and

81. Id.

82. Id. at 261-62, 800 S.E.2d at 578.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC v. J.B., 300 Ga. 840, 797 S.E.2d 87 (2017).
Id. at 840-41, 797 S.E.2d at 89.
Id. at 841, 797 S.E.2d at 89.
Id. at 840, 797 S.E.2d at 88.
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supervised.87 However, "in order to recover for any injuries resulting from
the breach of a duty, there must be evidence that the injuries were
proximately caused by the breach of the duty." 88 Intervening and

independent wrongful acts of a third person producing the injury should
be treated as the proximate cause unless such intervening act is
foreseeable. Since there is no question that the injuries sustained by the
patient would not have occurred without the nurse's criminal acts, the
question is whether the nurse's criminal acts were foreseeable to the
dental clinic.89
The court held that the dental profession is aware that sexual assault
of sedated patients can possibly occur "does not alone convert the [dental
clinic's] alleged breach of its duty to properly supervise [the nurse] into
liability on [the clinic's] part."90 Rather, for the breach to be considered
the cause of the patient's injuries, the nurse's criminal acts must be the
"'probable or natural consequences' of that breach, and it must be the
case that those criminal acts could 'reasonably have been anticipated,
apprehended, or foreseen' by [the dental clinic]."'9 1 The court concluded
that the evidence did not meet this standard. 92 As a result, the trial court
erred in failing to grant the dental clinic's motion for a directed verdict. 93
Second, under O.C.G.A. § 43-11-21.1,94 the patient asserted a
negligence per se claim. This statute governs when dentists may
administer general anesthesia. While there is consensus that the patient
falls within the class of persons intended to be protected by this statute,
the supreme court held a medical complication and not a sexual assault
is the type of harm against which the statute is intended to protect.98
VI. SUDDEN EMERGENCY DEFENSE

In Smith v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 96 the Georgia Court of
Appeals explored the proper application of the sudden emergency defense
in the context of a railroad accident. 97 The incident at issue began when

87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 841, 797 S.E.2d at 89.
Id.
Id. at 841-42, 797 S.E.2d at 89-90.
Id. at 843, 797 S.E.2d at 90.

91. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Ont. Sewing Mach. Co. v. Smith, 275 Ga. 683, 686,
572 S.E.2d 533, 536 (2002)).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 843, 797 S.E.2d at 91.
94. O.C.G.A. § 43-11-21.1 (2017).
95. Goldstein, 300 Ga. at 844-47, 797 S.E.2d at 91-93.
96. 337 Ga. App. 604, 788 S.E.2d 508 (2016).

97. Id.
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a pickup truck and a van collided into each other at an intersection,
causing the pickup truck to veer off course and come to rest on railroad
tracks. Subsequently, the crossing signals on the railroad track activated
and the roadway crossing gates closed for an approaching train. The
defendant's train was traveling within the required speed limit, but the
train engineer failed to comply with federal regulations requiring the
locomotive to blow one short blast followed by a long blast as it entered
the public crossing. Instead, after blowing the first short blast of the horn,
the conductor began to make an emergency stop of the train and failed to
make the second, long blast. Despite the engineer's efforts, the train
collided with the pickup truck in the intersection, killing a passenger who
had exited the truck but was still struck by the pickup truck because of
the collision. The deceased passenger's children sued the defendant train
company for wrongful death. The railroad company denied liability on
the grounds that the engineer's conduct was reasonable given the
emergency situation. 98
At trial, a jury returned a verdict for the defendant railroad. The
plaintiff appealed the verdict, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court
committed an error by charging the jury on the sudden emergency
defense. 99 The plaintiff contended there was no evidence that the
"engineer was faced with a choice between blowing the horn and applying
the emergency braking procedures without time for deliberation or
thought," and therefore the sudden emergency defense could not apply. 100
The court of appeals disagreed and sustained the judgment. 101
The court explained that in the event a defendant "is confronted with
a sudden emergency without sufficient time to determine with certainty
the best course to pursue, he is not held to the same accuracy of judgment
as would be required of him if he had time for deliberation." 102 In such a
circumstance, the jury may properly consider the existence of an
emergency when deciding whether the defendant exercised ordinary
care. 103 Stated differently, the sudden emergency defense may exist
where
[T]he evidence shows that there has been a sudden peril caused by
circumstances in which the defendant did not participate and which
offered him a choice of conduct without time for thought; under such

98.
99.
100.
101.
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103.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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at 604-05, 788 S.E.2d at 511-12.
at 604, 788 S.E.2d at 511.
at 608, 788 S.E.2d at 514.
(quoting Luke v. Powell, 63 Ga. App. 795, 804, 12 S.E.2d 196, 201 (1940)).
at 608-09, 788 S.E.2d at 514.
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circumstances, negligence in his choice might be attributable not to
lack of care but to lack of time to assess the situation. 104
However, the court insisted that the sudden emergency defense will
only apply to conduct that occurs immediately after the defendant
apprehends a danger and it also requires that the person confronted by
an emergency be presented with the choice of multiple reasonable
106
alternative courses of action. 105 Otherwise, the defense is inapplicable.
The court further advised that a jury charge on the sudden emergency
defense is proper where the defendant puts forth any evidence, however
slight, in support of the defense.10 7 Thus, a charge on the sudden
emergency defense is proper "even if there is conflicting evidence that
would allow the jury ultimately to find that an emergency did not
exist." 0 8
Applying these principles to the facts presented at trial, the court
concluded that sufficient evidence existed to support a jury charge on the
sudden emergency defense. 109 The court noted that the emergency
situation at issue was created by no fault of the railroad engineer, as the
pickup truck had been sent onto the railroad tracks ahead of the
oncoming train due to a collision with a third-party vehicle.110
Additionally, the court pointed to evidence that once the train engineer
recognized the emergency situation ahead on the train tracks, he was
presented with a choice between alternative courses of action with no
"time for thought or for careful reflection."1 11 To that end, the train
engineer testified that when he saw the pickup truck on the railroad
tracks, he was forced to choose in a split second between blowing the horn
a second time or performing a series of emergency braking procedures."1 2
Moreover, the court emphasized that only twenty-two seconds had
passed between the truck becoming disabled on the railroad tracks and
the time of the impact with the train. 113 The court concluded that, under
such circumstances, a jury charge on the sudden emergency defense was
proper and it was not error to so charge the jury.1 14
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Notably, the plaintiffs also argued that the sudden emergency defense
charge was improper because it was preempted by federal railroad
regulations that expressly require the manner in which a train horn must
be blown at a public railroad crossing, and also because the charge given
was an incomplete statement of the law that omitted a portion of the
pattern charge on sudden emergency.1 15 Rejecting these arguments, the
court first held that the arguments were waived by the plaintiffs' failure
to raise such objections to the jury charge during trial prior to the jury's
return of its verdict, such that the trial court had no opportunity to rule
on such objections. 116 In addition, the court held that even if such
objections had not been waived, any such error in the jury charge "did
not rise to the level of substantial error harmful as a matter of law."117
Specifically, from the evidence and argument presented at trial, the court
emphasized that the proximate cause of the passenger's death was the
negligence of the drivers of the pickup truck and van involved in the
motor vehicle collision, rather than the negligence of the train
engineer. 118 To that end, evidence was presented that any additional
blowing of the horn by the engineer would not have changed the outcome,
and the jury entered a special verdict on the negligence per se and
ordinary negligence claims, "expressly finding that the plaintiffs had not
proven . . . that [any defendant's] violation [of the federal railroad

regulations] was a proximate cause of [the passenger's] death."119 The
court concluded that the jury charge was not "so erroneous and
prejudicial as to deprive the plaintiffs of a fair trial."120
VII. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL

In Barnes v. Smith, 121 the Georgia Court of Appeals applied strict
limits on the imposition of personal liability of a corporation's underlying
shareholders, known as "piercing the corporate veil."1 22 Barnes is a dram
shop case in which the plaintiff sued, inter alia, the sole owner of a tavern
regarding injuries she sustained after being involved in a car accident
with an intoxicated patron of the tavern. The plaintiff alleged that the
tavern owner was individually liable for negligent training and for
negligent supervision. The tavern owner moved for summary judgment,
115.
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Id. at 610-11, 788 S.E.2d at 515.
Id. at 611-12, 788 S.E.2d at 515-16.
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asserting that there was no basis to pierce the corporate veil and hold
him individually liable. The trial court granted the tavern owner's motion
and dismissed him from the case. 123 The Georgia Court of Appeals
affirmed.124

The court of appeals "recognized that generally an officer of a
corporation who takes part in the commission of a tort by the corporation
is personally liable therefor[e]," but cautioned that the rule "is
inapplicable to claims against corporate officers involving negligent
training of corporate employees because a corporate officer's failure to
properly train an employee does not constitute sufficiently direct
participation in a tort leading to a plaintiffs injuries." 125 The court
likewise rejected the plaintiffs claim for negligent supervision against
the tavern owner.126 The court explained that an employer may be liable
for negligent supervision only where the employer "knew or should have
known of an employee's tendencies to engage in certain behavior relevant
to the injuries allegedly incurred by the plaintiff." 127 The court
emphasized that no evidence was presented that the bar owner himself
knew or should have known the bartender who served the intoxicated
patron required additional supervision based on her history of serving
alcohol to patrons.128
VIII. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
129

In Minott v. Merrill, the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Georgia considered the issue of punitive damages under state
law. 130 Minott involved a motor vehicle accident. The plaintiff alleged
that he was traveling in the right lane when the defendant's vehicle
struck the rear of his vehicle, causing the plaintiffs vehicle to spin off of
the road. The plaintiff did not report any injuries at the scene and no
citations were issued by responding officers. However, in a report of the
accident, an investigating officer noted that from the defendant driver's
statement, he had his cell phone resting on his leg at the time of the
accident, and had snatched at his steering wheel while attempting to
prevent the phone from slipping. The plaintiff sued the defendant driver,
alleging negligence and a myriad of damages, including punitive
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 607-08, 794 S.E.2d at 262-63.
Id. at 608, 794 S.E.2d at 263.
Id. at 609, 794 S.E.2d at 263.
Id. at 609, 794 S.E.2d at 264.
Id.
Id. at 609-10, 794 S.E.2d at 264.
No. 3:16-CV-3, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131783 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 27, 2016).
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damages. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the issue
punitive damages. 131
The court first noted that, under Georgia law, punitive damages are
available only upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence "that the
defendant's actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud,
wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise
the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences."1 32 Thus,
"[s]omething more than the mere commission of a tort is always required
for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or
outrage." 133 In the context of automobile cases, the court explained that
punitive damages may not be awarded "where the driver at fault simply
violated a rule of the road." 134 Instead, the court noted that the collision
causing injury must be the result of "a pattern or policy of dangerous
driving, such as driving while intoxicated or speeding excessively." 1 35
Ultimately, the court concluded that the defendant driver had merely
veered in the plaintiffs lane while trying to stop his cell phone from
falling to the floor of his car. 136 No evidence was presented reflecting a
pattern of dangerous driving. 137 As a result, the plaintiffs punitive
damages claim was dismissed as a matter of law.1 38
IX. RELATION BACK

In Gibson v. TJX Cos.,1 39 the Middle District of Georgia evaluated a
plaintiffs amended complaint filed after the Georgia statute of
limitations had expired.1 40 Gibson arose out of a slip and fall incident at
a retail store. The plaintiff filed suit against the retail store's parent
corporation, then filed an amended complaint attempting to add another
corporation after the statute of limitations had expired. The newly-added
defendant corporation moved to dismiss, alleging that the claim was
untimely.141 The court granted the defendant's motion. 142

131. Id. at *1, *3.
132. Id. at *3-4; see also O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(b) (2017).
133. Minott, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131783, at *4 (quoting Brooks v. Gray, 262 Ga. App.
232, 232, 585 S.E.2d 188, 189 (2003)).
134. Id. (quoting Miller v. Crumbley, 249 Ga. App. 403, 405, 548 S.E.2d 657, 659 (2001)).
135. Id. (quoting Miller, 249 Ga. App. at 405, 548 S.E.2d at 659).
136. Id. at *56.
137. Id. at *6.
138. Id.
139. No. 4:16-cv-209, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14400 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 2, 2017).
140. Id. at *1-2.
141. Id.at*1.
142. Id.
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The court reasoned that, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(c)(1)(A), 143 Georgia law controlled whether the amended
complaint would relate back to the initial complaint.144 Under O.C.G.A.
§ 9-11-15(c), the court noted that an amended complaint adding a new
defendant will relate back to the original complaint if:
[T]he claim "arises out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading" and "if
within the period provided by law for commencing the action against
him the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such
notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in
maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper
party, the action would have been brought against him." 1 4 5
Applying this rule, the court explained that the plaintiff had not
alleged the requisite facts in the amended complaint to satisfy the
Georgia statute and permit relation back. 146 For example, the plaintiff
did not allege in her amended complaint that the newly-added defendant
corporation received notice of the action within the limitations period, or
that the newly-added defendant corporation knew or should have known
that the action would have been brought against it but for a mistake
about the identity of the proper party. Furthermore, the amended
complaint did not allege that the newly-added defendant corporation
received notice of the lawsuit within ninety days of the filing of the initial
complaint.14 7 For those reasons, the court dismissed the plaintiffs claims
under the amended complaint against the newly-added defendant
corporation as a matter of law. 148
X. ANIMAL LAW
In Barking Hound Village, LLC v. Monyak, 149 the Georgia Supreme
Court considered the proper measure of damages available to the owners
of an animal injured or killed through the negligence of others.15o The
plaintiffs owned two dogs, a dachshund and a Labrador retriever. Both
dogs were boarded at a kennel for ten days. The Labrador retriever had
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FED. R. CIv. P. 15(c)(1)(A).
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been prescribed an anti-inflammatory medication, so the plaintiffs gave
specific instructions to employees of the kennel how such medication
should be administered only to the Labrador. Unexpectedly, the
dachshund suffered acute renal failure, underwent various veterinary
interventions, and eventually died. The plaintiffs alleged their
dachshund died because the employees at the kennel negligently
administered the medication to the wrong dog. 15 1
The plaintiffs sued the kennel, asserting various claims sounding in
fraud and negligence. The kennel ultimately moved for summary
judgment, arguing the plaintiffs' claims failed as a matter of law because
recoverable damages for the pet were limited to the market value of the
pet, and since the plaintiffs offered no evidence proving that the
dachshund had a market value, there were no damages. The trial court
denied the summary judgment motion, concluding the plaintiffs could
present evidence of the actual value of the dog, which included both the
reasonable veterinary expenses related to the dachshund's treatment as
well as non-economic evidence related to the dog's intrinsic value to the
couple. 152 The court of appeals granted interlocutory appeal of the
summary judgment order and reversed in part, holding that in "the
absence of a market value [being] shown, 'the measure of damages ... is
the actual value to the owner,"' but evidence of non-economic factors
regarding the dog's intrinsic value would not be admissible for the
purpose of establishing the actual value. 153 Unsatisfied that the court of
appeals did not limit damages to the market value of the dog, the kennel
appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. 154
Although the supreme court substantially agreed with the court of
appeals, it reversed in one key respect.155 Specifically, the supreme court
clarified that the fair market value and not the actual value of the animal
was the appropriate measure of damages, but these damages were not
the exclusive form of recoverable damages.156 Indeed, the supreme court
agreed that recoverable damages for the death of a pet are not limited to
the fair market value of the dog at the time of its loss, but instead include
reasonable expenses associated with veterinary care resulting from the

151. Id. at 145, 787 S.E.2d at 193.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 146, 787 S.E.2d at 194; see also Barking Hound Vilage, LLC v. Monyak, 331
Ga. App. 811, 813-15, 771 S.E.2d 191, 471-72 (2015) (quoting Cherry v. McCutchen, 65 Ga.
App. 301, 304, 16 S.E.2d 167, 169 (1941)).
154. Barking Hound Village, 299 Ga. at 146, 787 S.E.2d at 194.
155. Id. at 147, 787 S.E.2d at 195.
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injury to the animal. 15 7 Furthermore, the supreme court concluded these
damages are not capped based on the fair market value of the animal,
but instead they are damages that are separate from other recoverable
damages for the loss of the fair market value of the animal. 158
According to the court, the fair market value of an animal could be
established through "evidence that [the animal] was of a particular
breed, [or] had certain qualities" or "by witnesses who knew the market
value of such animal." 5 9 While the supreme court agreed with the
appellate court's conclusion that "[d]amages for the intrinsic value of the
dog are not recoverable," the supreme court noted that non-economic
evidence was not categorically inadmissible.16 0 Instead, the supreme
court held that qualitative evidence-for instance, testimony related to
an animal's "breed, age, training, temperament, and use"-was
admissible for the purpose of establishing the fair market value.161
Accordingly, as long as the evidence is related to the fair market value of
the dog, rather than simply its personal value to the owner, it would be
admissible for the purpose of determining damages. 162
XI. CONCLUSION

This survey period saw the Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia
Court of Appeals address an array of significant and interesting issues in
tort law, including the apportionment of damages between a security
company and property owner in a premises liability case, the liability of
a medical facility for sexual assault by a nurse, and the availability of
wrongful death claims for a suicide.
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